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CONSTRUCTION LAW
James R. Harvey, III *
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998 and 1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided
numerous cases that impact the practice of construction litigation
in the Commonwealth. This flurry of activity by the high court
reflects its apparent attempt to clarify an approach to the interpre-
tation of contracts that fall outside the scope of the Uniform
Commercial Code. By addressing an increasing number of cases in
this area of the law, the court has been able to adapt many of its
longstanding precedents to the problems found in today's construc-
tion contracting environment. This Survey article evaluates recent
construction cases concerning the use of applicable federal law in
contracts governed by Virginia law, the appropriate measure of
delay damages, the grounds for finding a contract or modification
between parties, the enforcement of liquidated damages provisions,
the proper enforcement of the statute of limitations or statute of
repose, and the application of statutory remedies.
II. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL LAW TO VIRGINIA CONTRACTS
A. Delay Damages and the Eichleay' Formula
The Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decision inFairfax County
Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Worcester Bros.2 is likely to
have a substantial impact on construction litigation in the Common-
wealth. In Worcester Brothers, the supreme court joined many
previous federal courts in awarding a contractor delay damages for
its extended unabsorbed home office overhead using the Eichleay
* Attorney, Vandeventer Black LLP, Norfolk, Virginia. BJA., 1989, University of
Virginia; J.D., 1996, College of William and Mary School of Law. Mr. Harvey concentrates
his practice in the field of construction litigation.
1. See Eichleay Corp., 60-2 B.C-.A (CCH) 1 2688 (1960), affd on recons., 61-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 2894 (1961).
2. 257 Va. 382, 514 S.E.2d 147(1999).
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formula.' With this decision, the supreme court solidified as
recoverable a previously untested measure of damages.
The undisputed facts demonstrated that the Authority delayed the
contractor's completion of a project because, at the time work
commenced, the Authority had not obtained the necessary clear-
ances from adjoining property owners.4 Worcester Brothers
mobilized, but was unable to perform work because of the owner's
delay. The Authority then denied Worcester Brothers' change order
application seeking to recover extended field and overhead costs
because they maintained personnel on the job site during the
"stand-by" period.5
At trial, Worcester Brothers established that the indefinite
"stand-by" status prevented them from engaging other work.6
Worcester Brothers then presented evidence of damages for
extended field overhead costs and for unabsorbed home office
overhead costs calculated using the Eichleay formula.7 The trial
court found that the contractor suffered damages as a result of the
Authority's "egregious" and "frankly inexcusable" delay and that
extended field overhead and unabsorbed home office overhead were
not only proper elements of the contractor's damages, but were
proven to a reasonable degree of certainty.'
On appeal, the Authority only challenged the trial court's ruling
that Worcester Brothers had proven its home office overhead with
reasonable certainty, by contending that (a) Worcester Brothers was
first required to demonstrate actual delay damages before present-
ing the Eichleay formula, and (b) the formula had not previously
met approval in Virginia.9 Rejecting the Authority's claims, the
supreme court expounded upon the propriety of using the Eichleay
formula for the calculation of unabsorbed home office overhead.'0
3. See Worcester Bros., 257 Va. at 390, 514 S.E.2d at 152.
4. See id. at 382, 514 S.E.2d at 147.
5. See id. at 385, 514 S.E.2d at 149.
6. See id.
7. See id. The Eichleay formula creates a ratio between the contractor's total receipts
and fixed (or home office) expenses and then compares the quotient to the delayed project's
receipts to assign a share of the contractor's fixed expenses assignable to that project. See id.
at 390 n.5, 514 S.E.2d at 152 n.5. It is the prevailing method used in federal government
contracts to calculate a contractor's home office expense due to a government-caused delay.
See id. at 385 n.2, 514 S.E.2d at 149 n.2; see also Capital Elec. v. United States, 729 F.2d 743,
744 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (using the Eichleay formula to calculate damages).
8. Worcester Brothers, 257 Va. at 386, 514 S.E.2d at 150.
9. See id. at 387-89, 514 S.E.2d at 150-51.
10. See id. at 388, 514 S.E.2d at 151.
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The court first found that unabsorbed overhead expenses are
recoverable if the contractor incurs direct costs because of the
"stand-by" period, such as additional labor or materials." "It is not
necessary for the contractor to show that its overhead was increased
as a result of the delay, but only that it could not otherwise
reasonably recoup its pro rata home office expenses incurred while
its workforce was idled by the delay." 2
The court then approved the use of the Eichleay formula in this
circumstance as "an intelligent and probable estimate" of the
contractor's damages." The court determined that the formula is not
a legal standard; rather, it is "a mathematical method of prorating
a contractor's total overhead, expenses for a particular contract."'4
The Eichleay formula is "an acceptable method, though not the only
possible method, of calculating the portion of home office expenses
attributable to delay."5
This firmly establishes in Virginia law a well-known method of
calculating delay costs. Despite the court's attempt to caveat its
application, litigants can be expected to use this now approved
calculation of damages whenever possible. Proof of direct costs
incurred during "stand-by" periods allows a contractor to claim
unabsorbed overhead which can often overshadow the direct costs.
The court's recognition of the full range of costs incurred because of
a workforce idled by an unexpected delay demonstrates a more
practical approach in resolving business disputes.
B. Using Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") Standards for
Differing Site Conditions
Further demonstrating a willingness to follow federal law on a
shared topic, in Asphalt Roads & Materials Co. v. Virginia Depart-
ment of Transportation,6 the Supreme Court of Virginia applied
federal cases interpreting the FAR'7 to interpret a similar "differing
11. See id.
12. Id. at 388, 514 S.E.2d at 151.
13. Id. at 390,514 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting Pebble Bldg. Co. v. G.J. Hopkins, Inc., 223 Va.
188, 191, 288 S.E.2d 437, 438 (1982)).
14. Id. at 389, 514 S.E.2d at 151-52.
15. Id. at 390, 514 S.E.2d at 152. It is important to note that the court limited this
holding to cases in which there is evidence that a contractor has suffered actual damages as
the result of an unreasonable delay caused by the owner. See id.
16. 257 Va. 452, 512 S.E.2d 804 (1999).
17. 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-2 (1984).
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site conditions" clause in a state contract. 8 The court used the
opportunity to clarify the utility for both owners and contractors in
relying upon the contract specifications to define the scope of work
and to define methods for adjusting a contract when conditions
differ. 19
In this case, the Virginia Department of Transportation ("VDOT")
refused to pay a contractor's full claim for the removal of unsuitable
soils and the import of acceptable backfill material. 0 "The contract
required the contractor to remove and replace [such unsuitable]
soil," but the drawings indicated a far smaller amount of soil than
the contractor ultimately found.2' VDOT had inserted a "differing
site conditions" clause similar to that used in the FAR, but con-
tended that the clause only applied to differences in character, not
deviations from estimated quantities in the specifications.22 After
determining that the contract provided the appropriate rate of
compensation for additional backfill material, the court addressed
whether the increased quantity of unsuitable soil was a differing
site condition.23
The supreme court looked to the federal courts' interpretation of
similar clauses to find that differing site conditions apply to excess
quantities.24 The court found that such clauses ensure the lowest
competent bid for basic services as the owner only pays for differing
conditions, including excess quantities as they occur.25 Otherwise,
contractors would have to increase their bids to account for unfore-
seen conditions or increase costs by undertaking their own borings
and inspections of the project while bidding for a contract. Instead,
the court found that contractors are entitled to rely upon the
accuracy of the specifications consistent with federal case law.27 This
case provides authority for Virginia courts to look to federal law
when interpreting common clauses and recognizes that an increase
18. See Asphalt Roads, 257 Va. at 457-60, 512 S.E.2d at 806-08.
19. See id. at 460, 512 S.E.2d at 808.
20. See id. at 454, 512 S.E.2d at 805.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 457, 512 S.E.2d at 807.
23. See id. at 456, 512 S.E.2d at 806.
24. See id. at 457-58, 512 S.E.2d at 807 (citing Foster Constr. C.A. v. United States, 435
F.2d 873, 887 (1970); Schutt Constr. Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 1018, 1021 (1965)).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 459-60, 512 S.E.2d at 807-08 (citing Foster Constr., 435 F.2d at 887; Schutt
Constr., 353 F.2d at 1021).
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in actual quantities from estimated quantities can qualify as a
differing site condition.
III. CONTRACT OR MODIFICATION EXISTENCE
A. Unsigned Contracts
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently clarified that a party is
not necessarily bound by an unsigned contract after performance.2
In Brooks & Co. General Contractors v. Randy Robinson Contract-
ing, Inc.,2' a general contractor orally accepted a subcontractor's bid
on a project but never made sure a signed contract existed before the
subcontractor began work on the project."0 The general contractor
sent the subcontractor an American Institute of Architects ("AIA")
form contract, but the subcontractor ignored it and commenced work
on the project without objection.3 1 The contractor argued that the
AIA contract mandating arbitration applied because, by perfor-
mance, the subcontractor accepted that contract's conditions. 2
The supreme court distinguished this case from its previous ruling
in Galloway Corp. v. S.B. Ballard Construction Co,33 which applied
the terms of an unsigned contract. 4 Unlike Galloway, in Brooks the
lack of signature was not an oversight," and an earlier parol
agreement existed that could define the parties' obligations.36
Robinson, the subcontractor, stated at trial that he had disagreed
with the terms of the AIA contract, and Brooks, the general
contractor, never insisted that those were the only terms that
applied to work on the project.37 The facts of the Brooks case
combined to enable the court to find that performance was not
manifest acceptance of the written contract as compared to the
Galloway facts. 8 As a result, the terms of the oral contract and not
the AIA contract controlled, and arbitration was not required.39
28. See Brooks & Co. Gen. Contractors v. Randy Robinson Contracting, Inc., 257 Va. 240,
245, 513 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1999).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 242-43, 513 S.E.2d at 858-59.
31. See id. at 242-43, 513 S.E.2d at 859.
32. See d. at 244, 513 S.E.2d at 859.
33. 250 Va. 493, 464 S.E.2d 349 (1995).
34. See id. at 506, 464 S.E.2d at 356-57.
35. See Brooks, 257 Va. at 242-43, 513 S.E.2d at 859.
36. See id. at 244, 513 S.E.2d at 860.
37. See id. at 242-43, 513 S.E.2d at 859.
38. See id. at 244, 513 S.E.2d at 860.
39. See id.
1999]
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The intent of the parties demonstrated that the'bid and oral
acceptance defined the limits of the agreement, and thus, the
obligations of the parties. This case, combined with Galloway,
creates some uncertainty for the all too common situation where a
party forgets or refuses to sign a contract. Close factual scrutiny is
now required to determine the intent of the contracting parties and
the prior agreements that may otherwise control the relationship.
B. Acceptance of Modifications
Using some of the same principles involved in Brooks, the
supreme court reached a somewhat contrary conclusion in Cardinal
Development Co. v. Stanley Construction Co.4 ° The court found that
oral acceptance of additional work obligated a developer to pay the
contractor for the extra work.4' In this case, the developer of a
subdivision plat increased the number of lots from 42 to 62, which
impacted the contractor's cost to install utilities on the site.42 The
developer verbally ordered the contractor to begin the additional
work.4" The contractor sent the developer itemized invoices reflect-
ing the cost for the extra work, yet the developer refused to make
payment."
Looking again to the intent of the parties, the supreme court found
that "a course of dealing 'may evince mutual intent to modify the
terms of a contract.' 45 The developer's instructions, acceptance of
the work, and partial payment all evinced his intent to pay for the
modifications in the amounts billed by the contractor.46 Again, the
intent of the parties and their subsequent actions are the key facts
in determining the terms of an oral, written, or modified contract.47
IV. ENFORCING LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISIONS
A topic of crucial importance to the construction community is the
application and enforceability of liquidated damages clauses. In
order to ensure timely performance, parties often sign contracts
40. 255 Va. 300, 497 S.E.2d 847 (1998).
41. See id. at 306, 497 S.E.2d at 851.
42. See id. at 303, 497 S.E.2d at 849.
43. See id. at 304, 497 S.E.2d at 850.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 305, 497 S.E.2d at 851 (quoting Stanley's Cafeteria, Inc. v. Abramson, 226 Va.





containing these clauses without a clear understanding of their
impact. Such provisions in contracts often contain language that
attempts to limit the parties' ability to contest the liquidated
damages provision, even if it acts as an unenforceable penalty. The
Supreme Court of Virginia recently approved of the application of
such a clause in a contract between energy providers in Gordonsville
Energy, L.P. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.4" In Gordonsville's
contract to provide electricity on demand to Virginia Electric and
Power Company ("VEPCO"), payments would be reduced by
$600,000 per day if Gordonsville exceeded its annual allotment of
"outage" days.49 In addition, the contract stated that Gordonsville
"waives any defense as to the validity of any liquidated damages
stated in this Agreement as they may appear on the grounds that
such liquidated damages are void as penalties or are not reasonably
related to actual damages."" When a generator failed for eleven days
through no fault of Gordonsville, VEPCO invoked the liquidated
damages clause, assessing a total of $6.6 million in liquidated
damages.51
Gordonsville argued that the outage qualified as a force majeure
and that, in any event, the waiver to the liquidated damages clause
violated public policy.52 Rejecting both arguments, the court looked
to the plain and unambiguous language of the contract as a matter
of law.53 After addressing the force majeure portion of the contract,
the court upheld the waiver of objection to the liquidated damages
clause stating:
We long have recognized that a party may enter into an agreement in
which he waives a significant right.... [TIhe evidence at trial estab-
lished that the entire Contract resulted from extended "arms-length"
negotiations between two sophisticated corporate entities, both
represented by counsel. Therefore, we conclude that Gordonsville's
contractual waiver is enforceable and bars its claims alleged in Count
V. 5 4
While the sophistication of the parties may have weighed heavily
in the decision of the court in Gordonsville to enforce the terms of
the contract, that same principle may lead to closer scrutiny of
48. 257 Va. 344, 512 S.E.2d 811 (1999).
49. See id. at 349, 512 S.E.2d at 814.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 349-53, 512 S.E.2d at 814-16.
52. See id at 352, 512 S.E.2d at 816.
53. See id. at 352-53, 512 S.E.2d at 816.
54. Id. at 355-56, 512 S.E.2d at 818 (citations omitted).
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liquidated damages provisions when imposed on other, less-sophisti-
cated parties. For instance, in O'Brian v. Langley School,55 the
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a trial court's grant of summary
judgment enforcing a liquidated damages clause.56 When the
O'Brians withdrew their daughter from the upcoming second grade
on June 13, 1996, the Langley School sought to enforce the enroll-
ment agreement's clause requiring full payment of a year's tuition,
costs, and legal fees, "in the event of withdrawal after June 1,
1996.""7 The trial court denied the O'Brian's motion to compel
discovery of the. school's actual damages and instead entered
judgment in the school's favor.58
Although the language of the liquidated damages provision
appeared clear and unambiguous, the court allowed O'Brian to
contest its enforceability. They had the burden, however, to demon-
strate that the clause was unenforceable because "the damage
resulting from a breach of contract is susceptible of definite mea-
surement, or where the stipulated amount would be grossly in excess
of the actual damages."59 The discovery requests were therefore
appropriate to determine the relationship between the stipulated
damages and the actual damages.
While it is possible to speculate that the court might be willing to
closely scrutinize harsh liquidated damages provisions imposed on
commercially unsophisticated parties, the practical import of
O'Brian may now be subsumed by Gordonsville. Because a waiver of
objection to liquidated damages received a supreme court stamp of
approval, parties seeking to enforce liquidated damages provisions
will soon include identical waiver language in their contracts. The
argument over unenforceable penalties may now be moot when
parties blindly waive this right in the contract.
55. 256 Va. 547, 507 S.E.2d 363 (1998).
56. See id. at 549, 507 S.E.2d at 366.
57. Id. at 550, 507 S.E.2d at 364.
58. See id. at 549, 507 S.E.2d at 365.





A. Project Completion and the Statute of Limitations
In Suffolk City School Board v. Conrad Bros.,6° the Supreme Court
of Virginia reaffirmed its decision in County School Board v. A.A
Beiro Construction Co.,61 that an action does not accrue on any part
of an indivisible construction contract until after final completion of
the entire project.62 Conrad, the general contractor, reached
substantial completion on two high schools for the city of Suffolk in
September of 1990.63 The contracts, however, provided for comple-
tion upon the issuance of a "Final Certificate for Payment," and that
was not made by the architect until March of 1991. In February of
1996, the school board sued Conrad for constructing defective
roofs.65
The contractor maintained that the action was untimely under
Virginia Code section 8.01-230 because the breach occurred more
than five years prior to the action's commencement.66 According to
the common law, the limitations period did not commence on an
indivisible contract until final performance, enabling a party to sue
either upon the occurrence of the breach or upon final performance.
The new Virginia Code, according to Conrad Bros., eliminated the
distinction in accrual between divisible and indivisible contracts,
specifying only breach, not final completion, as the critical date. 8
The court rejected this argument, stating that "§ 8.01-230 merely
codified existing law"69 and contract completion was required before
the limitations period would commence.°
60. 255 Va. 171, 495 S.E.2d 470 (1998).
61. 223 Va. 161, 286 S.E.2d 232 (1982).
62. See Conrad Bros., 255 Va. at 176, 495 S.E.2d at 473.
63. See id. at 173, 495 S.E.2d at 471.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 174, 495 S.E.2d at 472. Section 8.01-230 states in relevant part: "In every
action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the right of action shall be deemed
to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date when the
breach of contract occurs in actions ex contractu and not when the resulting damage is
discovered...." VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-230 (Cur. Supp. 1999).
67. See Andrews v. Sams, 233 Va. 55, 58,353 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1987); County Sch. Bd. v.
A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 223 Va. 161, 163, 286 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1982).
68. See Conrad Bros., 255 Va. at 175, 495 S.E.2d at 472.
69. Id. at 176, 495 S.E.2d at 472.
70. See id. at 176, 495 S.E.2d at 473.
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As a result of this decision, portions of construction projects
performed years before final completion may remain subject to suit
until the period for the entire contract has run. This serves as a
benefit to owners who can rely on a single, defined date from which
to measure the period in which they must take action for any defects
on a project. This "bright line" test also reinforces the contractor's
need to read, follow, and enforce each term of a contract for project
completion even though it realizes that a dispute is imminent.
B. Statute of Repose
Often an issue of concern in construction litigation is whether an
action falls within the Virginia statute of repose. The act limits the
bringing of a cause of action concerning unsafe real property
improvements causing property damage, personal injuries, or
wrongful death to five years from construction, regardless of when
the limitation period accrued.7 In Luebbers v. Fort Wayne Plastics,
Inc.,72 the Supreme Court of Virginia reexamined its distinction
between ordinary building materials and "equipment or machinery,"
the latter term being exempt from the five year period."
An item is an ordinary building material if it is incorporated into
work outside the control of the manufacturer and not subject to close
quality control after installation.74 According to the court, the steel
71. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Repl. Vol. 1992). Section 8.01-250 states:
No action to recover for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an
improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for
damages sustained as a result of such injury, shall be brought against any person
performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction,
or construction of such improvement to real property more than five years after the
performance of furnishing of such services and construction.
The limitation prescribed in this section shall not apply to the manufacturer or
supplier of any equipment or machinery or other articles installed in a structure upon
real property, nor to any person in actual possession and in control of the
improvement as owner, tenant or otherwise at the time the defective or unsafe,
condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or
damage for which the action is brought; rather each such action shall be brought
within the time next after such injury occurs as provided in sections 8.01-243 and
8.01-246.
Id. A personal injury action would not accrue until the injury is sustained, which may be
many years after completion of the construction. See id. § 8.01-230 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
72. 255 Va. 368, 498 S.E.2d 911 (1998).
73. Id. at 372, 498 S.E.2d at 913 (citing Grice v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp., 236 Va.
305,374 S.E.2d 17 (1988); Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596,331
S.E.2d 476 (1985)).
74. See Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480.
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panels, braces, and vinyl liners made by Fort Wayne and used in a
swimming pool's construction qualified as ordinary building
materials because they were so fungible and generic within the pool
industry that they served no function until incorporated into a
finished pool.75 By focusing on the pool as a unit and the fungibility
of the supplies, this decision narrows the universe of items that fit
within the definition of "equipment or machinery."
With regard to the same statute of repose, in Tate v. Colony House
Builders, Inc.,76 the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified that the
statute does not apply to actions for constructive fraud, but is
instead limited to its enumerated actions.7" In Tate, a home buyer
sued the manufacturer, claiming constructive fraud because of false
representations made prior to the purchase.7" The supreme court
reversed the trial court's decision that the fraud action was barred
by the statute of repose, holding that the statute only applies to an
injury to property, bodily injury or wrongful death.79
Fraud is not a tort specified in the statute because, as we have stated,
the wrongful act involved in fraud is "aimed at the person." We also
stated that because "fraud invariably acts upon the person of the
victim, rather than upon property its consequence is personal damage
rather than injury to property.' 0
As Luebbers and Tate demonstrate, the court continues to strictly
construe the General Assembly's language whenever possible.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY ACTIONS
A. Mechanics Liens
In Carolina Builders Corp. v. Cenit Equity Co.,"1 the Supreme
Court of Virginia invalidated a mechanic's lien because it contained
a claim for sums due more than 150 days from the date the supplier
last provided materials to the job. 2 Virginia Code section 43-4
requires that a "lien claimant may file any number of memoranda
75. See Luebbers, 255 Va. at 372-73, 498 S.E.2d at 913.
76. 257 Va. 78, 508 S.E.2d 597 (1999).
77. See id. at 84,508 S.E.2d at 600.
78. See id. at 80-81, 508 S.E.2d at 598.
79. See id. at 85, 508 S.E.2d at 600-01.
80. Id. at 85, 508 S.E.2d at 601 (quoting J.F. Turner & Son v. Staunton Prod. Credit
Assoc., 237 Va. 155,158,375 S.E.2d 530,531 (1996); Pigot v. Moran, 231 Va. 76,81,34 S.E.2d
179, 182 (1986)).
81. 257 Va. 405, 512 S.E.2d 550 (1999).
82. See id. at 407, 512 S.E.2d at 550.
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but no memorandum shall include sums due for labor or materials
furnished more than 150 days prior to the last day on which labor
was performed or materials furnished to the job preceding the filing
of such memorandum." 3 Carolina Builders filed a lien memorandum
claiming sums due for materials provided within the 150 day period
and sums due for materials provided more than 150 days prior to the
date it last provided materials to the job.84
The supreme court reached a seemingly harsh result of denying
the entire lien, stating that the 150 day period is a statutory
requirement to the perfection of the lien and simply reducing the
lien to the amount due within the 150 day period is not possible.85
Because mechanic's liens are creatures of statutes, the perfection
requirements are strictly construed.86 Carolina Builders should have
filed multiple liens as the work progressed unpaid, and not have
waited to the end of the project. Instead, it was denied its entire lien
because part of the lien violated the statute, and Carolina Builders
could not concurrently file a proper lien memorandum. Despite the
practical impact this decision may have on contractors and suppliers
attempting to get paid on a project without resorting to legal action,
the clear message sent by the court to all potential lien claimants is
that timeliness and precision are essential to the maintenance of a
successful lien action.
B. The Virginia Public Procurement Act
Just as the supreme court strictly construed the perfection of a
mechanic's lien, in Sabre Construction Corp. v. County of Fairfax88
the court strictly construed the Virginia Public Procurement Act89 to
dismiss a bid protest that did not strictly comply with the statute's
provisions.9 ° Sabre wished to contest the county's award of a contract
to a competitor, made in part because Sabre failed to submit a
responsive bid containing all requested alternate bids.9' Sabre filed
a bid protest, and then proceeded to file suit one day before the
county issued its written opinion denying the protest.92 Virginia
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
84. See Carolina Builders, 257 Va. at 408, 512 S.E.2d at 551.
85. See id. at 411-12, 512 S.E.2d at 553.
86. See id. at 410, 512 S.E.2d. at 552.
87. See id. at 412, 512 S.E.2d at 553.
88. 256 Va. 68, 501 S.E.2d 144 (1998).
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
90. See Sabre, 256 Va. at 73, 501 S.E.2d at 147-48.
91. See id. at 69-70, 501 S.E.2d at 146.
92. See id. at 70, 501 S.E.2d at 146.
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Code section 11-66 requires a bidder to file its action in the circuit
court "within ten days of the written decision."93 As a result, the
county filed a motion to dismiss because the suit was filed before the
written decision and thus in derogation of section 11-66. 9'
The supreme court concurred with the county, concluding that the
special limitations to the act are a "condition precedent to maintain-
ing a claim and failure to comply with [them] bars the claim."95 Just
as the court said of mechanic's liens in Carolina Builders, the Sabre
court emphasized that "The Public Procurement Act constitutes a
waiver of public bodies' sovereign immunity, is in derogation of the
common law, and, therefore must be strictly construed."9" Like
Carolina Builders, this is a seemingly harsh result enforced by the
court for deviation from the statute's requirements. While these two
cases might be factually uncommon, the principles emphasized by
the court will often resound in defense of any statutory action not in
strict compliance.
VII. CONCLUSION
When taken as a whole, the cases decided in the two previous
years impacting construction litigation may create some artificial
themes. The Fairfax County and Asphalt Roads decisions indicate
that the court appears more ready than ever to countenance process
and reasoning developed in the federal courts. The court's rulings on
contract interpretation in Brooks, Cardinal Development, Gordons-
ville and O'Brian continue to emphasize the intent of parties when
contracting as well as their relative sophistication before entering
potentially complex agreements. However, the broad freedom to
contract and sacrifice rights contained in preprinted waivers may
serve only to further create onerous provisions of which the commer-
cially unsophisticated have little knowledge or birgaining power
against. Finally, despite the court's ruling in Conrad Brothers that
the statute on accrual of actions conforms with the common law on
indivisible contracts in spite of its language, the court continues to
strictly construe rights of litigants that are granted by statute.
Luebbers, Carolina Builders, and Sabre Construction demonstrate
that principle, and a failure to strictly comply with the statutory
93. VA CODE ANN. § 11-66 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
94. See Sabre, 256 Va. at 70, 501 S.E.2d at 146.
95. I& at 72, 501 S.E.2d at 147.
96. Id. at 73, 501 S.E.2d at 147 (citing Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248,250-
51, 467 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1996)).
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requirements will often lead to the harsh result of no maintainable
action. In sum, it is a positive development to see the Supreme Court
of Virginia take such an active interest in this area of the law and
attempt to provide clarity for judges, lawyers, and potential litigants
when interpreting and evaluating potential construction litigation
cases.
